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ARTICLES
RULES AND STANDARDS IN JUSTICE SCALIA’S
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Robert M. Bloom *
Eliza S. Walker **
INTRODUCTION
When looking at Justice Scalia’s approach to the Fourth Amendment, most would say he was an originalist and a textualist.1 Justice Scalia himself would like to explain, “I’m an originalist and a
textualist, not a nut.”2 Although originalism and textualism were
often prevalent in his Fourth Amendment decisions, even more important to his decision-making was his disdain for judicial activism.3 To limit judicial discretion, Justice Scalia frequently opted to
* Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School.
** J.D., 2020, Boston College Law School; Law Clerk, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court.
1. See, e.g., DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT’S ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 12 (2018) (“Scalia made a career of preaching
‘originalism’ and ‘textualism.’”); Timothy C. MacDonnell, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment: Text, Context, Clarity, and Occasional Faint-Hearted Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L.
175 (2015) (examining Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment opinions where he employs
originalism and textualism). Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation based
on the idea that words have fixed meanings and should be understood the way they were
understood at the time of the framing. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 78–92, 435 (2012). Textualism is the theory of
interpreting the Constitution based only on what the text says and fairly implies. See id. at
xxvii, 16.
2. Nina Totenberg, Justice Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens Up, NPR (Apr. 28, 2008,
7:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89986017 [https://perma.
cc/L62G-DE37].
3. Professor John Manning makes this argument with respect to Justice Scalia’s overall jurisprudence. See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint,
115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 748 (2017); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 78 (1992) (“In other words, for Justice Scalia,
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impose bright-line rules rather than vague standards.4 This is apparent not only within his jurisprudence as a whole, but also specifically in his Fourth Amendment decisions.5
In his article Originalism: The Lesser Evil, Justice Scalia denounced nonoriginalists because their approach invites judicial activism.6 Though Scalia acknowledged that originalism had its defects,7 he argued that it was strongly preferable to nonoriginalism
because it constrained a judge’s ability to impose his or her own
moral or political values onto the law.8 Making decisions about current social values, Scalia argued, was better left to the elected legislature.9 Originalism was superior because it required judges to
justify their rulings with something external to themselves.10
In his book A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia further disparaged the common law—or as he would call it, judge-made law.11

the rule’s the thing; originalism and traditionalism are means, not ends.”).
4. Stephen G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 483, 486 (2014) (discussing Scalia’s preference for rules).
5. Professor Orin Kerr, in a panel discussion at the 2016 Federalist Society National
Lawyers Convention, noted that Justice Scalia’s impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been partially overlooked. See David Stras, Orin Kerr, Rachel Barkow, Stephanos
Bibas & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Justice Scalia and the Criminal Law, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 743,
744 (2018).
6. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989)
[hereinafter Scalia, Originalism] (“The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my
view, is its incompatibility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.”).
7. In 1989 Scalia admitted that he might be merely a “faint-hearted originalist” because he could not imagine himself upholding a statute requiring flogging—even though it
would have been upheld in 1791. Id. at 864. By 2013, though, his faint-heartedness had
receded. In an interview with New York magazine, he stated that he would, in fact, uphold
a law permitting flogging because though “it is immensely stupid . . . it is not unconstitutional.” Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, NEW YORK (Oct. 4, 2013),
https://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ [https://perma.cc/2PKG-W2F4].
Instead of faint-hearted, he now referred to himself as an honest originalist—that is, one
who “take[s] the bitter with the sweet.” Id.
8. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 6, at 863 (“It is very difficult for a person to discern
a difference between those political values that he personally thinks most important, and
those political values that are ‘fundamental to our society.’”).
9. Id. at 854.
10. Id. at 864 (“Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system,
for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself.”).
11. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 4
(1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION] (noting that the common law does not necessarily reflect people’s practices but is rather law created by judges).
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Describing a first-year law school class discussing a series of hypotheticals, he wrote mockingly, “What intellectual fun all of this
is!”12 He noted law school is exhilarating because it consists of
“playing king”—that is, playing common-law judge—by deciding
how and what the law should be.13 All of this would be well and
good, Scalia said, if it weren’t for a little thing called democracy.14
In the criminal context, one justification for choosing between a
standard and a rule is the need to safeguard the rights of unpopular criminal defendants.15 Justice Scalia discussed this issue in The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. He wrote that one of the utilities of
bright-line rules was that they allowed judges to serve countermajoritarian interests.16 Firm rules are most important, he said, in
cases where the popular will might come out the other way:
It is very difficult to say that a particular convicted felon who is the
object of widespread hatred must go free because, on balance, we think
that excluding the defense attorney from the line-up process in this
case may have prevented a fair trial. It is easier to say that our cases
plainly hold that, absent exigent circumstances, such exclusion is a
per se denial of due process.17

Bright-line rules, Scalia argued, allowed judges to be “courageous”—that is, to stand up to “occasional excesses of [the] popular
will.”18
Justice Scalia didn’t only condemn judicial activism in his extracurricular writing, but also—often quite sharply—in his decisions.
In his dissent in Dickerson v. United States, for example, he re-

12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. (“[First-year law school] consists of playing king—devising, out of the brilliance
of one’s own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind. How exciting! And no wonder
so many law students, having drunk at this intoxicating well, aspire for the rest of their
lives to be judges!”).
14. Id. at 9.
15. See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1189 (1988)
(arguing that Fourth Amendment cases that use balancing tests deserve increased scrutiny
to properly protect the rights of unpopular criminal defendants).
16. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Law of Rules].
17. Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)). Justice Scalia expressed a
similar sentiment in Arizona v. Hicks, when he stated that “the Constitution sometimes
insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.” 480 U.S. 321, 329
(1987).
18. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1180.
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buked the majority for holding that the rule from Miranda v. Arizona was constitutional and therefore could not be superseded by
Congress.19 The Miranda decision, Scalia argued, was pure judicial
activism: it was in no way required by the Constitution.20 He accused the majority of violating the separation of powers and becoming “some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or
thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends
its collective fancy.”21 Justice Scalia’s concern with judicial discretion also manifested in his theory of statutory interpretation. For
example, in Zuni Public School District Number 89 v. Department
of Education, he dissented, berating the majority for purporting to
interpret “unenacted congressional intent.”22 He characterized the
majority’s theory of statutory interpretation as “sheer applesauce,”
and voiced his concern that when a judge purports to interpret congressional intent, the interpretation tends to have a remarkable
similarity to whatever judges think Congress should have meant.23
Though Zuni Public School District dealt with per-pupil expenditures—a relatively apolitical issue—Justice Scalia noted his concern with the impact that interpreting so-called congressional intent would have in cases “more likely to arouse the judicial libido”
such as voting rights or antidiscrimination.24 He preferred brightline rules that would restrict judges’ ability to impose their own
morals, ethics, and politics onto the law.25

19. 530 U.S. 428, 445–46 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)).
20. See id. at 448–49.
21. Id. at 455. He called the majority opinion “antidemocratic” and wrote that it “converts Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops’ Pyramid (or
perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance.” Id. at 446, 465.
22. 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 113, 117.
24. Id. at 118.
25. Justice Scalia further criticized activist judging in the civil procedure context in
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990). Writing for the plurality, he denounced Justice Brennan’s concurrence for relying on “contemporary notions of due process.” Id. He argued that this formulation gave judges license to break with the test of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” and replace it with merely their notions
of fair play and substantial justice. Id. In his formulation he focused on the term “tradition”
to argue for a historical approach. Id. at 621. He thought we should formulate rules of jurisdiction the way we have always done it. See id.
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This Article examines Justice Scalia’s effort to limit judicial discretion through the lens of the debate between rules and standards.26 It is the first article to situate Scalia’s goal of limited discretion within the framework of the debate between rules and
standards, as well as the first to discuss this issue specifically with
respect to his Fourth Amendment decisions.27 Rules are binding
directives that leave little room for considering the specific facts of
any given situation.28 Critics argue that they tend to be over- or
under-inclusive, but the value of rules is that by taking power away
from the decisionmaker, they limit judicial discretion.29 Further,
some argue that rules promote democracy because they properly
leave the power to make decisions based on politics or value judgments to the legislature.30 On the flip side, proponents of standards
argue that standards produce judgments that are less arbitrary
and more substantively fair because they allow decisionmakers to
consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.31

26. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 57–121 (outlining the debate between rules and standards as a debate around how much discretion judges should have and by what means courts
should keep discretion in check). Professor Kathryn Urbonya has analyzed the implications
of how modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence vacillates between rules and standards.
See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme
Court’s Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1387–89 (2003).
27. Other scholars have analyzed Justice Scalia’s interest in judicial restraint in his
jurisprudence writ large, but to our knowledge no one has situated it within the framework
of rules and standards. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 3, at 748–50 (discussing what he calls
Scalia’s “anti-discretion principle”); Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4 (critiquing Justice
Scalia’s preference for rules from an originalist perspective); David A. Strauss, On the
Origin of Rules (with Apologies to Darwin): A Comment on Antonin Scalia’s The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 997 (2008) (discussing Scalia’s preference for rules).
Further, various scholars have discussed Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
yet have not specifically analyzed his preference for rules in the Fourth Amendment. See,
e.g., MacDonnell, supra note 1 (analyzing Scalia’s Fourth Amendment decisions through an
originalist and textualist lens); Steven Wisotsky, The Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence of
Justice Scalia, 52 CRIM. L. BULL. 531 (2016) (cataloging and summarizing all of Scalia’s
Fourth Amendment decisions); see generally Stras et al., supra note 5, at 744 (panel discussion where Professor Orin Kerr argued that the two broad themes in Scalia’s jurisprudence
were originalism and limiting judicial discretion).
28. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 58.
29. Id. at 62–66 (listing arguments for rules as fairness as formal equality, utility, liberty, and democracy); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353, 369 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[B]alancing tests amount to brief nods by the
Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an
unanalyzed exercise of judicial will.”).
30. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 64–65.
31. Id. at 66–69 (listing arguments in favor of standards as fairness as substantive justice, utility, equality, and deliberation).
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Justice Scalia has been called the leading supporter of the
“rules-as-democracy argument.”32 He argued that rules were preferable because they are more likely to ensure equal treatment
among like cases, they make the law clear in a system where the
Supreme Court can review only a small number of cases, and they
ensure predictability.33
How does this philosophy of limited judicial discretion manifest
in the Fourth Amendment context? Because the Fourth Amendment specifically prohibits “unreasonable” searches—which arguably dictates a standard—Justice Scalia often sought to construct
rules that could curb a limitless interpretation of “unreasonable.”34
Further, the Fourth Amendment context is unique because of the
strong interest for police to have intelligible rules dictating the
scope of any potential search.35
In criminal Fourth Amendment cases, Justice Scalia usually applied rules.36 He noted that rules allowed judges to serve countermajoritarian interests by protecting the rights of unpopular criminal defendants.37 However, Scalia occasionally strayed from his
rules-oriented philosophy and applied a standard.38 This was especially true in cases involving civil special needs as well as cases
dealing with remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.39 Attempts to classify Justice Scalia as favoring the government or favoring individual Fourth Amendment rights are fraught with difficulty. It is probably best to characterize him as in favor of rules
in the criminal context, and in favor of standards in other contexts.

32. Id. at 65.
33. See Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1178–79. He stated that sometimes “even
a bad rule is better than no rule at all.” Id. at 1179. He argued that general rules that
constrain judges are good—not only because they constrain lower courts, but also because
they constrain future Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 1179–80.
34. See infra section I.B.2.
35. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 203, 206 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the importance of workable rules for police). But see New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 463, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s imposition of a bright-line rule because “the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more
efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment” (quoting Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978))).
36. See infra Part I.
37. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1180.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part II.
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Part I of this Article discusses Scalia’s Fourth Amendment cases
in the criminal context.40 It first discusses his methodology when
approaching Fourth Amendment cases, and then outlines the cases
where he advocated for bright-line rules that would limit judicial
discretion.41 Part II demonstrates his departure from the rules approach in civil special needs cases and cases involving remedies for
Fourth Amendment violations.42
I. RULES: “FIRM BUT ALSO BRIGHT”43
In his Fourth Amendment decisions, Justice Scalia favored
bright-line rules that would limit judicial discretion. He spoke frequently about the need to root decisions in something external to a
judge’s own political predilections.44 In his Fourth Amendment
cases, he rooted his bright-line rules in probable cause, textualism,
and originalism.45
Section A of this Part outlines Justice Scalia’s basic Fourth
Amendment philosophy.46 Section B discusses the relationship between the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment and lays out what
we will call Scalia’s “probable cause presumption.”47 Section C
looks at cases where Justice Scalia used originalism and textualism to limit judicial discretion.48 Finally, Section D discusses Justice Scalia’s revival of the trespass test for when a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, and discusses its lasting legacy as the
Court grapples with how to apply the Fourth Amendment in the
digital age.49

40. See infra Part I.
41. See infra Part I.
42. See infra Part II.
43. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“That line . . . must not only be
firm but also bright.”).
44. See, e.g., Scalia, Originalism, supra note 6, at 864.
45. See infra Part I.
46. See infra section I.A.
47. See infra section I.B.
48. See infra section I.C.
49. See infra section I.D.
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A. Basic Fourth Amendment Philosophy
Justice Scalia hated Fourth Amendment cases.50 He did not like
the often fact-specific inquiry of determining what was “reasonable,” but because the Constitution specifically prohibits “unreasonable” searches, as a textualist he could not avoid it.51 He preferred
to leave lower courts to determine “reasonableness,” and wrote
that the Supreme Court should only take Fourth Amendment cases
periodically to indicate the limits of acceptable variation.52
Justice Scalia prescribed a two-step analysis for Fourth Amendment cases:
[W]e inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful
search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the
search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.53

In other words, first he asked whether there was an analogous
practice when the Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791.54 If so,
then that answer remains true today. On the other hand, for novel
questions where there was no equivalent practice in 1791, the
50. See Stras et al., supra note 5, at 744 (citing Interview by Susan Swain with Antonin
Scalia, in Washington, D.C. (June 19, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?286079-1/su
preme-court-justice-scalia [https://perma.cc/U4T2-KYCZ] (“I just hate Fourth Amendment
cases. It’s almost a jury question, you know, whether this variation is an unreasonable
search or seizure. It’s variation 3,542. Yes, I’ll write the opinion, but I don’t consider it a
plum.”)).
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Other legal standards that use “reasonableness,” like
the “reasonable man” in torts or the “reasonable expectation of privacy” from Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), are not specifically prescribed
by the Constitution. See Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1181–82 (discussing the
differences between the “reasonable man” and “reasonable search” analyses); infra section
I.D (discussing the Katz test).
52. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1186.
53. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To determine what is an ‘unreasonable’ search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we look first to the historical practices the
Framers sought to preserve; if those provide inadequate guidance, we apply traditional
standards of reasonableness.”).
54. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is assuredly room for such an approach in resolving novel questions of search
and seizure under the ‘reasonableness’ standard that the Fourth Amendment sets forth. But
not, I think, in resolving those questions in which a clear answer already existed in 1791
and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of society ever since.”).
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Court should apply “traditional standards of reasonableness” by
balancing the degree of privacy intrusion against the governmental interest.55
This balancing should ostensibly be geared towards what would
have been “reasonable” in 1791, not merely what is expedient today.56 Justice Scalia believed that the Fourth Amendment must
protect the same degree of privacy that was protected in 1791, regardless of what new ways technology has found to invade our privacy.57 To determine whether a novel type of search or seizure is
“reasonable” requires balancing the competing concerns of the privacy interests of individuals versus the needs of law enforcement.58
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia limited his use of the balancing approach to civil special needs cases and cases involving remedies for
Fourth Amendment violations.59 In criminal cases, he would often
turn to the second clause of the Fourth Amendment to help him
55. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300. Justice Stevens criticized this approach in his dissent in Wyoming v. Houghton. Id. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued: “[W]e have
never restricted ourselves to a two-step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy
and governmental interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law
‘yields no answer.’ Neither the precedent cited by the Court, nor the majority’s opinion in
this case, mandate that approach.” Id.
56. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures “is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925))); see also Lawrence
Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence During the Career of Justice Scalia, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 90–91 (2018) (discussing
the original public meaning of “unreasonable”).
57. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“At bottom, [the Court] must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)));
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The purpose of the provision, in other
words, is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability
of their property that existed when the provision was adopted—even if a later, less virtuous
age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable.’”); California
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded.”).
58. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“In determining the reasonableness of
the manner in which a seizure is effected, ‘we must balance the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” (quoting United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995)
(“[W]here there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search
at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search
meets the reasonableness standard ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”
(quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989))).
59. See infra Part II.
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define the vague term “unreasonable.”60 In this way he often looked
to the probable cause standard in the second clause to give meaning to the term “unreasonable” in the first.61
An example of Justice Scalia’s two-step approach can be found
in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin.62 There, Justice Scalia based
his opinion in the first part of the two-step analysis.63 He dissented,
berating the majority for engaging in a balancing test even though
a clear answer existed in 1791.64 In that case, the majority held
that someone who is arrested without a warrant must be brought
in front of a judge no later than 48 hours after the arrest.65 Justice
Scalia criticized the majority for engaging in a balancing test—between public safety on the one hand, and the need to avoid prolonged detention on the other—when a clear answer existed in
1791.66 In 1791, Scalia said, a suspect arrested without a warrant
was required to be put in front of a magistrate “as soon as he reasonably can.”67 Scalia argued that different courts would strike the
balance in different ways, and that the Fourth Amendment served
to “put this matter beyond time, place, and judicial predilection.”68
Justice Scalia favored bright-line rules because they limited judicial discretion. But not just any bright-line rule would do.69 The
rule needed to be faithful to the text of the Constitution and based
on something external to the judge’s own will.70 In McLaughlin,
60. See infra section I.B.2.
61. See infra section I.B.2.
62. 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 56 (majority opinion).
66. Id. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 61 (citing 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 95 n.13 (1847)).
68. Id. at 65, 66.
69. Professor Manning argued that contrary to popular opinion, Justice Scalia did not
care only about rules qua rules. Manning, supra note 3, at 748–49. Rather, his philosophy
was based more deeply on the insistence that judges must justify their decisions on something external to their own wills. See id.
70. See id. at 770. For an example outside of the Fourth Amendment context, see Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). There, Justice Scalia
sharply criticized a bright-line rule—the requirement of Miranda warnings—because he
found it had no basis in the text or history of the Constitution. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
450 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). He argued that
the clear rule from Miranda was no easier to apply than a totality of the circumstances test.
See id. at 463 (“It is not immediately apparent, however, that the judicial burden has been
eased by the ‘bright-line’ rules adopted in Miranda . . . Moreover, it is not clear why the
Court thinks that the ‘totality-of-the-circumstances’ test . . . is more difficult than Miranda
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the majority’s judgment was indeed a bright-line rule, but it was a
rule that was not faithful to the original meaning of the Constitution: the 48-hour rule conflicted with the practices used at the time
the Fourth Amendment was enacted.71 Thus, Scalia criticized it,
finding that it eliminated a right that existed at the time of the
framing.72
Justice Scalia touched on this distinction in his essay The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules.73 He noted that it was possible to establish a general rule that was not based on something external to the
judges’ own wills, but only because “with five votes anything is possible.”74 He found that if a general rule was not based on a “solid
textual anchor or an established social norm” then there was no
difference between it and rule-making properly done by the legislature.75
B. Limited Reasonableness: The Warrant & Probable Cause
Presumptions
1. The Warrant Presumption
A critical issue for interpreting the Fourth Amendment is
whether its two clauses should be read separately or together.76
The first clause dictates the right to be free from “unreasonable”
searches and seizures and the second clause states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”77 The traditional view
was that the second clause gave meaning to the first: a search without a warrant was presumptively unreasonable.78 This view is also

for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.”).
71. 500 U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (arguing that the majority opinion “eliminates a very old right indeed”).
73. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1184–85.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1185.
76. See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE POLICE 12 (9th ed. 2020); Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, An Examination
of the Coherence of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 275,
279–80 (2016).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a comprehensive analysis of the two views of the Fourth
Amendment, see Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468 (1985).
78. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 257, 257–58 (1985) (calling this reading the “conventional interpretation”).
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referred to as the “warrant preference” school of interpretation.79
It is exhibited in the frequently cited line from Katz v. United
States, a Warren Court decision, where the Court stated that warrantless searches were “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”80
The Warren Court preference for a warrant was later displaced
by the Burger Court’s approach, which expanded on existing exceptions to the warrant requirement.81 In his 1991 concurrence in
California v. Acevedo, Justice Scalia noted that the warrant requirement now contained so many exceptions that it was practically unrecognizable.82 He noted that while it was “textually possible” that the word “unreasonable” implicitly contained the
requirement of a warrant, the general rule requiring a warrant in
all circumstances had no basis in the common law.83 This view is
often referred to as the “reasonableness” school of interpretation.84
A majority of the Court has, at times, adopted this view, stating
that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is merely “reasonableness.”85 Under this view, the Warrant Clause does not modify

79. See, e.g., BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 76, at 12.
80. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
81. See Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement—The Burger Court Approach, 53 U.
COLO. L. REV. 691, 693 (1982); see also Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the
Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1026–27
(2001) (noting that the Court began to stray from the warrant preference view in the 1990s).
82. 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing exceptions including
“searches incident to arrest . . . automobile searches . . . exigent circumstances . . . search[es]
incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat boarding for document
checks . . . welfare searches . . . inventory searches . . . airport searches . . . school search[es]
. . . .” (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1773–74 (1985))).
83. Id. at 582–84.
84. See, e.g., BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 76, at 12. An early expression of the reasonableness school appears in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (“A rule
of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable may be
appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this
requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search . .
. . The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable.”).
85. See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47
(2009) (“The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment, we have often said, is ‘reasonableness.’”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“Nevertheless, because the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement
is subject to certain exceptions.”); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (“[The
Fourth Amendment’s] ‘central requirement’ is one of reasonableness.” (quoting Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983))).
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the Reasonableness Clause; the Warrant Clause solely lays out the
requirements of a valid warrant.86 Various critics have stated that
Justice Scalia endorsed the “reasonableness” school of interpretation.87
As evidence, these critics cite the fact that, in 2004, Justice
Scalia signed on to Justice Thomas’s dissent in Groh v. Ramirez,
which endorsed the reasonableness school.88 There, a federal agent
applied for a warrant to search a large ranch in Montana, but did
not properly list with particularity the items he intended to seize.89
The majority held that the warrant was plainly invalid because it
did not meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.90
It stated that because the warrant was so obviously defective, the
search was essentially warrantless.91 It adopted the “warrant preference” view of the Fourth Amendment, stating that warrantless
searches were presumptively unreasonable.92 Thus, it held that the
search at issue in the case was unreasonable.93
Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent, arguing against
the warrant presumption.94 Justice Thomas cited a long line of
cases vacillating between requiring a warrant and recognizing
some exception to the warrant requirement.95 He wrote that
though the precise relationship between the clauses was not certain, neither clause explicitly required a warrant.96 He followed the
86. Kahn-Fogel, supra note 76, at 279–80.
87. See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 194–95 (noting that Scalia believed the Fourth
Amendment did not contain a warrant presumption); Seamon, supra note 81, at 1026–29
(noting that Scalia has played a “major role” in the trend away from a broad warrant presumption). Each of these analyses, though, was published before Scalia’s 2015 dissent in
Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015), which provides greater clarity on his view of the
relationship between the two clauses.
88. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571, 573–74 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 199.
89. Groh, 540 U.S. at 554. The application for the warrant listed various types of weapons and was supported with a detailed affidavit. Id. The warrant itself, however, was much
less specific: it described only the house the agent intended to search, but did not describe
the weapons he intended to seize. Id. It did not incorporate by reference the detailed list of
weapons he had provided in the warrant application. Id. at 554–55.
90. Id. at 557. Though the application listed the “things to be seized,” that did not rescue
the warrant from the failure. Id.
91. Id. at 559.
92. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
93. Id. at 563.
94. Id. at 571, 573–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 572–73.
96. Id. at 571.
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reasonableness school and argued that the search in the case had
been reasonable, and therefore was constitutional.97
Justice Scalia’s own views on the warrant presumption, however, were slightly more nuanced. In his 2015 dissent in City of Los
Angeles v. Patel, Justice Scalia expounded on the relationship between the two clauses.98 There, a group of motel operators in California facially challenged a municipal code that required hotel operators to keep records with identifying information about their
guests and let police officers inspect the records on demand.99 The
majority held that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it did not afford an opportunity for motel operators to seek
judicial review before being required to turn over requested records.100 It adopted the warrant preference interpretation, citing the
clause in Katz stating that warrantless searches were “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.”101 The search at issue did not comply
with the requirements of the administrative search exception because it did not provide an option for precompliance review, and
thus the Court struck it down.102
Justice Scalia dissented. He argued that the touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment was “reasonableness” and that the search at
issue was reasonable because it was constitutional in almost every
instance.103 Despite appearing to endorse the reasonableness
school of interpretation, though, Justice Scalia suggested that two
clauses of the Fourth Amendment were not wholly separate:
Grammatically, the two clauses of the Amendment seem to be independent—and directed at entirely different actors. The former tells
the executive what it must do when it conducts a search, and the latter
tells the judiciary what it must do when it issues a search warrant.
But in an effort to guide courts in applying the Search-and-Seizure
Clause’s indeterminate reasonableness standard, and to maintain coherence in our case law, we have used the Warrant Clause as a guidepost for assessing the reasonableness of a search, and have erected a

97. Id. at 573.
98. 576 U.S. 409, 428, 430–31 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 412–13 (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 418. The statute provided that hotel operators who did not comply with police
requests could be arrested on the spot. Id. at 421.
101. Id. at 419 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
102. Id. at 421.
103. Id. at 430–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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framework of presumptions applicable to broad categories of searches
conducted by executive officials. Our case law has repeatedly recognized, however, that these are mere presumptions, and the only constitutional requirement is that a search be reasonable.104

Though Scalia argued that the clauses were technically separate,
he stated that the second one was a “guidepost” to understand the
word “reasonableness” in the first.105 Justice Scalia did not believe
in a warrant requirement, but appeared—at least at the end of his
career—to believe in a warrant presumption.106
A warrant presumption, though, does not add much utility in
crafting bright-line rules because there are so many exceptions to
the warrant requirement.107 In 1991, Justice Scalia wrote that the
warrant requirement “had become so riddled with exceptions that
it was basically unrecognizable.”108 It has essentially reached the
point that it is no longer a rule at all, but rather a standard.109
Nevertheless, in his concurrence in Bailey v. United States, Justice Scalia argued that extending an exception to the warrant requirement should be limited.110 He argued that the categorical
bright-line rule which allowed for the temporary detention of occupants during the execution of a search warrant should not be extended to include an occupant who had recently left the premises.111 He quoted the language of Michigan v. Summers, stating
that, “If police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a categorical
basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police
officers.’”112

104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing the following
exceptions to the warrant requirement: searches incident to arrest, automobile searches,
searches of “pervasively regulated” businesses, administrative searches, exigent circumstances, mobile home searches, inventory searches, border searches).
108. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 58 n.231 (noting that the difference between rules and
standards is a continuum, not a divide; at some point a rule can have so many exceptions
that it becomes a standard).
110. 568 U.S. 186, 203 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 204.
112. Id. at 206 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)).
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2. The Probable Cause Presumption
The warrant presumption is not the only part of the second
clause that Justice Scalia appears to read into the word “reasonableness.” Many of his cases evince what we will call a “probable
cause presumption”: often, when deciding whether a search is reasonable, Justice Scalia based his decision on whether there was
probable cause. This method gave him a benchmark with which to
craft bright-line rules.
As with the notion of warrants, from the second clause, Justice
Scalia appeared not to believe in a probable cause requirement, but
rather a probable cause presumption.113 He acknowledged that
there were categories of cases, such as administrative searches,
that required less justification than probable cause.114 And yet in
the criminal context, Justice Scalia chose to root his analysis in
probable cause again and again. If there was probable cause, he
declined to engage in a balancing analysis and found the search
was “ipso facto” reasonable.115 This strategy facilitated making
bright-line rules that limited judicial discretion.
For example, in Arizona v. Hicks, Justice Scalia rooted his opinion in the need for probable cause.116 In that case, a bullet was fired
through the floor of James Hicks’s apartment.117 Police entered
without a warrant to search for the shooter, and found and seized
three weapons.118 While in the apartment, one of the officers observed some expensive stereo equipment, which he deemed out of
113. See Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 431 (2015). The probable cause presumption
should be distinguished from the probable cause requirement, which various scholars have
examined. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 78, at 304–09. The probable cause requirement
is the idea that even warrantless searches must have probable cause to be reasonable. Id.
Under this view, the real harm the Framers sought to protect against was not warrantless
searches, but rather searches done without probable cause. Id. Professor Akhil Reed Amar
has criticized this view. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 782–85 (1994). He argued the idea of a probable cause requirement was
nonsensical both because it is not textually required by the words of the Fourth Amendment,
and because there are numerous searches for which probable cause is not required, such as
consent searches, administrative searches, and weapons pat-downs. Id. at 783.
114. See Patel, 576 U.S. at 430–31.
115. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
116. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). Professor Kannar provided a valuable analysis of Hicks in his
1990 article The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1324–28 (1990).
117. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
118. Id. at 323–34.
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place in the otherwise “squalid” apartment.119 To determine if the
equipment was stolen, the officer moved the stereo slightly so he
could record its serial number.120 He reported the serial number to
police headquarters by phone, was advised that some of the equipment had been stolen in a recent armed robbery, and seized it.121
Justice Scalia noted that though the officer had lawfully entered
the apartment pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception,
moving the equipment to inspect the serial number was an unrelated “search.”122 And that search required probable cause.123
The dissents made policy arguments: Justice Powell argued that
the distinction between “merely looking at” an item in plain view
and slightly moving it was trivial.124 Justice O’Connor argued that
the case presented a mere “cursory inspection” and not a “fullblown search” and balanced the government and individual interests to find that it was justified.125 She accused Justice Scalia of
ignoring precedent and placing serious constraints on law enforcement in order to establish a bright-line rule—something which, she
argued, had only theoretical advantages.126
In response, Justice Scalia stated that the standard Justice
O’Connor proposed would “send police and judges into a new
thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain
description that is neither a ‘plain view’ inspection nor yet a ‘fullblown search.’”127 “A search is a search,” he wrote, “even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.”128 He resisted the use of any policy-inflected balancing tests, even acknowledging that there might have been no lawful way for the officer to
have ascertained whether the equipment was stolen if he did not
have probable cause.129 “[T]here is nothing new,” he wrote, “in the

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 324–25.
Id. at 324–26.
Id. at 328, 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 335 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 328–29 (majority opinion).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 329.
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realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”130 Instead
of allowing Justice O’Connor’s flexible standard of something less
than a “search” that would require some lesser justification, Justice Scalia firmly rooted his bright-line rule in the requirement of
probable cause.
Similarly, in California v. Acevedo, Justice Scalia again rooted
his decision in probable cause presumption.131 There, officers observed a man leaving an apartment known to contain multiple
packages of marijuana.132 The man carried a paper bag, got into
his car, and began to drive away.133 Officers stopped and searched
the man’s car—including the paper bag—where they found marijuana.134 The majority found that the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement applied to this search, and therefore it was
lawful.135 It eliminated any separate container analysis, noting
that a clear-cut rule was preferable: police officers can search
cars—including containers therein—without a warrant if they
have probable cause.136 The majority endorsed the warrant preference interpretation in dicta, noting that the automobile exception
was merely one of the “specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”137
Justice Scalia concurred, but disagreed with the majority’s warrant preference approach.138 He stated that the Fourth Amendment contains no warrant requirement; it merely prohibits “unreasonable” searches.139 He acknowledged that it was “textually
possible” to consider that the word “unreasonable” implicitly contained the requirement of a warrant.140 But, he noted that the
130. Id.
131. 500 U.S. 565, 581–85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 579–80. The majority held that there was no distinction between a standard
search of a vehicle, and a search of the closed containers within that vehicle. Id. So long as
there was probable cause to justify the search, each is constitutional. Id.
136. Id. at 579.
137. Id. at 580.
138. Id. at 581–85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 581 (“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant
for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’”).
140. Id. at 582.
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Court had “lurched back and forth” between the two views, such
that the “warrant requirement” was so “riddled with exceptions
that it was basically unrecognizable.”141 He went on to say that a
general rule requiring a warrant in all circumstances had no basis
in the common law.142 Like in Hicks, Justice Scalia allowed a warrantless search so long as it was based upon probable cause.143
Though he professed to adopt the view that the clauses were separate, he nonetheless required that the warrantless search be based
upon probable cause.144
In Wyoming v. Houghton, too, Justice Scalia rooted his analysis
in probable cause.145 There, David Young and his girlfriend, Sandra Houghton, were stopped by Wyoming Highway Patrol for a
traffic violation.146 During the stop, the officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in Mr. Young’s shirt pocket.147 He asked Mr. Young
why he had the syringe, and Mr. Young replied candidly that he
used it to take drugs.148 The officer then searched the vehicle, and
found Ms. Houghton’s purse which contained methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia.149
The trial court denied Ms. Houghton’s motion to suppress, holding that the officer had probable cause to search the car, and therefore could search all closed containers in the vehicle.150 The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, holding that probable cause did not
extend to the personal effects of a passenger who was not suspected

141. Id. In 2001, Professor Seamon noted that this criticism had apparently resonated,
as at that time the majority’s opinion in Acevedo was the last time the warrant preference
school appeared in a majority opinion. Seamon, supra note 81, at 1027. He posited that “the
broad version of the presumption seems to have died from embarrassment.” Id. In more
recent years, though, this prediction has not borne out. Since 2001, the Court has continued
to fluctuate between the warrant preference school and the reasonableness school, and has
adopted the warrant preference school in various cases. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v.
Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419–20 (2015); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 563 (2004).
142. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583–84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
143. See id. at 585.
144. See id.
145. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300–01 (1999).
146. Id. at 297–98.
147. Id. at 298.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 299.
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of criminal activity.151 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reversed the decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court, holding that
the search did not violate Ms. Houghton’s Fourth Amendment
rights.152 He focused on the fact that officers had probable cause to
believe the car contained drugs.153 He cited Carroll v. United States
and United States v. Ross, which discussed historical legislation
that let customs officials search ships if they had probable cause.154
Because merchandise was shipped in containers, the authority to
search with probable cause must have included the authority to
search closed containers; officers could not have needed a separate
warrant for each shipping container.155 Thus, he held that neither
precedent nor historical evidence recognized a distinction between
closed containers based on who owned them.156 He laid down a
bright-line rule that where there is probable cause to search a car,
it is reasonable for officers to search all closed containers in the
car—including the passenger’s personal possessions.157
In Arizona v. Gant, Justice Scalia again used the notion of probable cause in the second clause to inform his interpretation of “reasonableness” in the first.158 In that case, Rodney Gant was arrested
for driving with a suspended license.159 After he was handcuffed
and placed in the backseat of a police patrol car, two officers
searched his vehicle.160 They found a gun and a bag of cocaine.161

151. Id.
152. Id. at 302.
153. Id. at 300.
154. Id. at 300–01 (first citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); and then
citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 n.26 (1982)).
155. Id. at 301 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 n.26).
156. Id. at 302.
157. Id. Justice Scalia then went on to say that even if the historical evidence was unpersuasive, a balancing of interests also weighed in favor of allowing the search. Id. at 303.
He noted that passengers in cars on public roads have a reduced expectation of privacy,
whereas the government interest in being able to search a vehicle—which could easily leave
the scene if officers were required to wait for a warrant—was substantial. Id. at 303–04. He
noted that a criminal could easily hide contraband in his passenger’s belongings—even without the passenger’s knowledge or permission—to evade a potential search. Id. at 304–05.
He stated that the gray area of this rule would invite a flood of litigation about various
factors showing whether an item was owned by the driver or a passenger. Id. at 305–06. He
wrote that this practical reality must be accounted for in the balancing analysis. Id. at 306.
158. 556 U.S. 332, 351–54 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 336 (majority opinion).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Mr. Gant moved to suppress the items, arguing that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.162 The majority
adopted the warrant preference school, citing the statement in
Katz that the warrant requirement is “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”163 One of those
exceptions, it noted, was a search incident to a lawful arrest, which
was espoused in Chimel v. California.164
In 1969, in Chimel, the Court had held that a search incident to
arrest extends not only to the arrestee’s person, but also to the
“grabbable space” around him.165 In 1981, in New York v. Belton,
the Court applied this exception to people arrested while driving.166
There, the Court held that the Chimel exception extended to the
interior of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, even if the
occupant was no longer in reaching distance of it.167
In Gant, the Court rejected this broad reading of Belton, and
held that the Chimel rationale only applies where the arrestee is
“unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”168 The majority stated, alternatively, that a search of the interior of the vehicle could be justified if it was “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”169 In this case, the majority

162. Id.
163. Id. at 338 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted)).
164. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
165. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
166. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
167. Id. Much of the rationale in Belton was regarding the necessity of clear rules in the
Fourth Amendment context. Id. at 458. The Court cited Professor LaFave’s article, arguing
that Fourth Amendment protection is futile unless law enforcement is bound by a set of
clear rules. Id. (citing Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142). The Court stated: “When
a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.” Id. at 459–60. The dissent called the majority’s brightline “arbitrary,” and argued that the mere fact that a rule is supposedly more efficient for
law enforcement “can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 469
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued, moreover, that the majority’s rule abandoned
the primary justifications from Chimel because it applied whether or not the occupant was,
in fact, still in reaching distance of the interior of the car. Id. at 470.
168. 556 U.S. at 343. The Gant opinion was 5–4; Justice Scalia’s concurring vote was
necessary to reach a majority.
169. Id. (quoting Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Justice Scalia had previously espoused this view in his concurrence in Thorton, 541
U.S. at 632.
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stated that the defendant was arrested for a traffic violation, and
therefore there was no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle
would contain evidence of that crime.170 Thus, because Mr. Gant
was secured in the backseat of a police vehicle, and there was no
reason to believe his car would contain evidence of the crime of arrest, the majority held the search was unreasonable.171
Justice Scalia concurred, arguing that the Court should “simply
abandon the Belton–Thorton charade of officer safety and overrule
those cases.”172 Justice Scalia was needed to make up a majority,
and characterized the majority concession to probable cause as an
artificial narrowing of the majority opinion. He agreed only with
the majority’s second rationale: that officers could search a vehicle
incident to arrest if they had probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest would be found.173 He stated that such
a search was “ipso facto ‘reasonable.’”174 This statement is consistent with the idea that the word “reasonable” contains within it
a presumption of probable cause.175 Justice Scalia used this analysis to cut through the uncertainties produced by the majority’s
holding, which allowed “reasonableness” to be proven in multiple
ways.176 The rule he professed was simple: if officers had probable
cause that evidence would be found in the vehicle, they could
search it. If not, they could not.
In Whren v. United States, Justice Scalia once again rooted his
analysis in probable cause.177 There, plainclothes officers were patrolling a “high drug area” of Washington, D.C. in an unmarked
car.178 They noticed a truck with temporary license plates and
“youthful occupants” stop at an intersection for an “unusually long
time.”179 The officers did a U-turn to follow the truck.180 The truck
turned right without signaling and took off at an “unreasonable”

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 343 (majority opinion).
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996).
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id.
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speed.181 The officers followed, eventually pulled up next to it, and
directed the driver to pull over.182 The officer then noticed two large
plastic bags he believed to contain crack cocaine in Michael
Whren’s—the passenger’s—hands.183 Mr. Whren and the driver—
James Brown—were both indicted on various drug charges.184
Mr. Whren and Mr. Brown moved to suppress the drugs, arguing
that the alleged purpose for the stop—giving the driver a warning
about traffic violations—was pretextual.185 They pointed out that
it was not common for vice detectives to worry about traffic violations.186 Though they acknowledged that the officers had probable
cause to believe they had committed a civil traffic violation, they
argued that “‘in the unique context of civil traffic regulations’ probable cause is not enough.”187 They argued that because the civil
traffic code was so vast, officers will almost always have reason to
stop someone for some technical violation.188 This created an environment, they argued, where police could choose whom to stop
based on discriminatory factors—such as race—as both Mr. Whren
and Mr. Brown were African-American.189
Mr. Whren and Mr. Brown proposed a balancing analysis, arguing that the Court should determine “whether the officer’s conduct
deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop
for the reasons given.”190 They asserted that the Court should engage in a balancing analysis, and weigh the governmental and individual interests.191
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, refused to adopt the balancing analysis.192 While he acknowledged that various Fourth
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 808–09.
184. Id. at 809.
185. Id.
186. Brief for Petitioners at 5–7, Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841).
187. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 814.
191. Id. at 816.
192. Id. at 817. He also stated that while the petitioners’ proposed standard claimed to
be objective by not looking at the officer’s subjective motivations, it was nonetheless a subjective standard. Id. at 813–14.
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Amendment cases did rely on balancing analyses, he stated that if
the search or seizure was based upon probable cause, the balance
clearly weighed in favor of the government.193 He noted that the
searches in the cases petitioners cited all took place without probable cause, and thus balancing had been necessary.194 The only exceptions to this rule, he said, were “extraordinary” searches or seizures—such as seizures by means of deadly force—where the Court
should balance interests even though there had been probable
cause.195 But for the ordinary case, Scalia said, the rule was that
probable cause justifies a search and seizure.196 Thus, because here
the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated a traffic code, the search and seizure was reasonable.197 Instead of determining whether an officer’s action was “reasonable”
based on a variety of factors, Scalia again rooted his analysis in the
bright-line rule of probable cause.
C. Originalism and Textualism
Justice Scalia also used originalism and textualism to limit judicial discretion. This framework aided him in formulating brightline rules. He argued that this method made it easier for him to
develop general rules, because without grounding one’s reasoning
within a textualist or originalist framework, rules could sound eerily like legislation.198 He thought that nonoriginalism left judges
too much discretion to impose their own politics and morals into
their decisions.199 In this context he was a true textualist, turning
193. Id. at 817 (“It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since
it turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.
With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is not in
doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.”).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 818.
196. Id. at 819.
197. Id.
198. See Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1184–85.
199. See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 6, at 854–56. Scalia’s originalist and textualist
philosophy was not without its critics. Professors Lawrence Tribe and Ronald Dworkin have
argued that they, not Scalia, are the genuine originalists and textualists. David M. Zlotnick,
Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to His Constitutional
Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1406 (1999). Professors Calabresi and Lawson, further,
have examined to what extent the Constitution itself prescribes rules over standards. See
Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 489–97. They determined that there are many places
where the Constitution itself prescribes standards—such as “due process,” “speedy” trials,
“impartial” juries, bails that are not “excessive.” Id. at 497. In many cases, though—such as
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to the words of the Fourth Amendment itself. In these cases, he
was not determining whether a search or seizure was “reasonable,”
but whether a search or seizure had even occurred in the first
place.
For example in California v. Hodari D., Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, replaced the vague standard from United States
v. Mendenhall with a bright-line rule.200 In that case, a group of
young men in Oakland, California, saw officers patrolling the area,
panicked, and ran.201 The officers, suspicious, chased the men.202
While running, one of the men—Hodari D.—tossed away a small
item.203 One of the officers subsequently tackled Hodari and handcuffed him.204 Hodari moved to suppress the item, which was discovered to be cocaine, on the basis that he had been “seized” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment while the officer was chasing him.205 Hodari argued that by chasing him, the officer had engaged in a “show of authority.”206 He cited the plurality in Mendenhall to argue that a seizure occurs where “a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”207
Justice Scalia found that the language of the Fourth Amendment did not support Hodari’s argument.208 “Seizure,” Scalia said,
meant some application of physical force; a mere “show of authority” was not sufficient.209 The Mendenhall test was a necessary, but
not sufficient, factor for a seizure to have occurred.210 Justice Scalia
held that a “seizure” required either physical force, or, not only a
show of authority but submission to that authority.211 Merely being
the nondelegation doctrine—they argue that Scalia ignored original meaning, and opted
instead to create bright-line rules. Id. at 489–90. Thus, they argue that Scalia’s preference
for rules often thwarts other considerations such as original meaning. Id. at 495.
200. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991) (citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)); Zlotnick, supra note 199, at 1390–91 (noting that
Scalia tends to define words as narrowly as possible, and calling Hodari D. an example of
“constitutional law by Webster’s”).
201. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 622–23.
202. Id. at 623.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 625–26 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
207. Id. at 627–28 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
208. Id. at 626.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 628.
211. Id. at 626.
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chased by the police and not complying did not constitute a seizure
because there was no submission.212
Justice Scalia discussed the definition of “seizure” two years
prior in his essay The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules.213 He criticized the Mendenhall test as it was applied in Michigan v. Chesternut.214 There, the majority applied the Mendenhall test and
found that a “seizure” had occurred when “a person in the defendant’s position would not have felt that he was free to disregard the
police and go about his business.”215 Justice Scalia called this “a
rule of sorts,” but found it was not as precise as it should be.216 He
instead joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, stating that there
had been no “seizure” until there was a “restraining effect.”217
Scalia noted that his textualist methodology made it easier for him
than for other judges to develop general rules.218
Similarly, in Minnesota v. Carter, Justice Scalia turned to the
wording of the Fourth Amendment.219 In that case, a police officer
looked in an apartment window through a gap in the closed blinds
and saw two men bagging cocaine.220 The Court held that one of
the men, Mr. Carter, did not have standing to contest the alleged
search.221 Mr. Carter did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the plurality contended, because he was merely at the apartment to engage in a short-term business transaction.222 There was
no suggestion, the plurality stated, that Mr. Carter had a previous
relationship with the person who lived in the apartment, or anything akin to the relationship of an overnight guest at his host’s
212. Id.
213. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1184.
214. Id. (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 576–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
218. Id. Professor David Strauss, though, argued that Scalia’s interpretation of the word
“seizure” is not based on its plain meaning. Strauss, supra note 27, at 1005. Strauss noted
that in context, a “seizure” applies to police action, and there are plenty of circumstances in
which an officer has “seized” someone though he has not physically grabbed or taken possession of him. Id. For example, when an officer points a weapon at a person and orders him
to stop. Id. Professor Strauss argued that instead of deriving the rule from the text, Scalia
first decided he would like to use a rule, not a standard, and second crafted a rule that could
then be made compatible with the meaning of “seizure.” Id. at 1005.
219. 525 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 85 (majority opinion).
221. Id. at 90.
222. Id. at 91.
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apartment.223 While an overnight visitor might have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, someone who visited an apartment only to
participate in a brief business transaction did not.224
Justice Scalia concurred, rooting his analysis in the meaning of
the word “their” in the Fourth Amendment.225 He analyzed founding-era materials to determine that the phrase “right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects”226 meant
that each person had a right to be free in “his own person, house,
papers, and effects.”227 He concurred with the majority that because Mr. Carter was not in his house, or even any house that he
could have considered a temporary residence, the Fourth Amendment was not violated.228 Thus, Justice Scalia used textualism to
formulate a bright-line rule.
D. Keeping Easy Cases Easy: The Trespass Test and Its
Applicability in the Digital Age
Probably the most significant contribution Justice Scalia made
to future Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was reintroducing the
trespass standard.229 Some argue that this standard could provide
a more predictable way to analyze searches in the digital age.230
Justice Scalia favored the trespass test over the test from Katz v.
United States, which analyzed expectations of privacy.231 The Katz
test originated in Justice Harlan’s 1967 concurrence in Katz.232 It
established a two-fold requirement: first, that one have a subjective expectation of privacy; and second, that society recognizes this

223. Id. at 90–91 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., concurring). He rejected the majority’s reliance on the Katz
test to determine if a search had occurred. Id. at 91–92.
226. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
227. Carter, 525 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 97 (noting that it is implausible to call an apartment someone uses only to
package cocaine his “temporary residence”).
229. MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 232.
230. See infra notes 308–13 and accompanying text.
231. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
232. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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expectation as reasonable.233 For years, the Katz test was considered the only standard.234
Not surprisingly, Scalia loathed the Katz test. It allowed for judicial activism to an extreme. Even before reviving the alternative
trespass test to use in its stead,235 he repeatedly questioned Katz’s
validity. For example, in 1987 in O’Connor v. Ortega, the majority
opinion used Katz to hold that searches and seizures by government employers of the offices of their employees should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.236 Scalia—then in only his second
term on the Court—concurred, writing that the majority’s standard was “so devoid of content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field.”237
In 1998, Justice Scalia attacked Katz even more explicitly in
Minnesota v. Carter.238 The majority rooted its analysis in Katz: it
stated that one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in an apartment which one has entered only to engage in a shortterm business transaction—in this case, bagging cocaine.239 Justice
Scalia concurred, criticizing the plurality for using the Katz test,
which he called not only “fuzzy” but also “self-indulgent.”240 He argued that the second prong of the Katz test—whether society recognizes an expectation as “reasonable”—bore an “uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers
reasonable.”241 He saw Katz as a means for judges to impose their

233. See id. at 361.
234. MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 233 (noting that until 2012, Katz was the primary
test); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
316 (2012) (noting that from the 1960s until 2012, the Katz test governed).
235. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07. Justice Scalia did, however, occasionally employ the
Katz test, most notably in Kyllo v. United States and his special needs cases. See infra notes
246–57 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A.
236. 480 U.S. 709, 717–18 (1987) (“Given the great variety of work environments in the
public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy
must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”).
237. Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring).
238. 525 U.S. 83, 97–98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra notes 219–28 and
accompanying text.
239. Carter, 525 U.S. at 86, 90–91.
240. Id. at 91, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 97.
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own values and policy views onto the Fourth Amendment, and argued that such decisions should be more properly left to the legislature.242
In other instances, however, Scalia did allow the Court to determine what was “reasonable,” because the determination was based
on the text of the Fourth Amendment. Analyzing whether a warrantless search is “unreasonable”—in contrast to whether one has
a “reasonable expectation of privacy”—is based on the text of the
Fourth Amendment itself.243 Justice Scalia noted that the Katz test
might have some utility in determining whether a search was “unreasonable.”244 But he thought that employing a “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis to determine whether a search had even
occurred, in contrast, had no justification in the text of the Fourth
Amendment.245
When Justice Scalia was tasked to write the majority opinion of
the Court, he would occasionally give lip-service to the Katz test.
For example, in Kyllo v. United States, federal agents became suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his triplex and
used a thermal imager to scan the building from the outside to detect whether it contained high-intensity lamps typically used to
grow marijuana.246 The scan showed that parts of Mr. Kyllo’s home
were substantially warmer than the neighboring apartments, and
based on that information—as well as tips from informants and
utility bills—the officers applied for and were granted a warrant to
search his home.247 The search revealed more than one hundred
marijuana plants and Mr. Kyllo was charged with manufacturing
marijuana.248

242. Id. at 97–99.
243. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra section I.B; see also Calabresi & Lawson, supra
note 4, at 497 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable” searches
and seizures is an example of when the Constitution prescribes using a standard and not a
rule); Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1181–82 (expounding on why a “reasonable
search” is a question of law, yet “reasonable care” in a torts case is a question of fact).
244. Carter, 525 U.S. at 86, 91–92 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the “legitimate
expectation of privacy” analysis “is often relevant to whether a search or seizure covered by
the Fourth Amendment is ‘unreasonable’”).
245. Id. at 91, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
246. 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). Scalia also used Katz in special needs cases. See infra
section II.A.
247. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
248. Id.
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, used the Katz test despite his distaste for it.249 He wrote that while in other areas Katz
was difficult to apply, in the home—the “prototypical” area of protected privacy—it was clear what baseline expectation of privacy
was reasonable.250 Here, applying Katz was consistent with the
wording of the Fourth Amendment, which specifically protects
“houses.”251 Justice Scalia employed Katz to protect the amount of
privacy people enjoyed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.252 He held that when the government uses technology not
in general public use to glean information about the home that
would formerly have been unknowable without physically entering
the home, “the surveillance is a ‘search.’”253
Though in Kyllo he used Katz, Scalia formulated a bright-line
rule, not a “fuzzy standard.”254 The line he chose was at the entrance to the home.255 “That line,” he wrote, “must not only be firm
but also bright.”256 Despite the fact that Justice Scalia intended to
implement a bright-line rule, Justice Stevens commented on the
use of technology not in general public use and argued that it was
not as clear as Scalia had intended. Justice Stevens wrote that “the
contours of the new rule are uncertain because its protection apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is ‘in general
public use.’”257
In United States v. Jones in 2012, Justice Scalia renewed his attack on Katz, this time reviving an alternative test to use in its
stead.258 The common-law trespass test, which Scalia revived, had
dominated Fourth Amendment law until the second half of the
249. See id. at 32–33. Justice Scalia cited his concurrence in Carter and acknowledged
that the Katz test had “often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.” Id. at 34 (citing Carter, 525 U.S. at 97).
250. Id.
251. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
252. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see Rosenthal, supra note 56, at 117 (describing Kyllo as
originalist because it insisted on preserving original degree of privacy). Here, Justice Scalia
was employing the second part of his two-step methodology: because thermal imaging did
not exist in 1791, there was no clear practice to look to. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, he proceeded to the second step, and determined
“traditional standards of reasonableness.” See id.
253. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
254. See id.; see also Carter, 525 U.S. at 91 (criticizing Katz for being a “fuzzy standard”).
255. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion).
258. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–06 (2012).
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20th century.259 In Jones, the FBI suspected nightclub owner Antoine Jones of drug trafficking.260 The government obtained a warrant to install a GPS tracking device on Mr. Jones’s wife’s Jeep.261
The warrant was valid in the District of Columbia for ten days.262
On the eleventh day—and in Maryland, not D.C.—agents physically installed a GPS tracker on the bottom of the Jeep while it sat
in a public parking lot.263 The government proceeded to track the
Jeep for the next twenty-eight days.264 The government then used
the location information to indict Mr. Jones on various drug distribution charges.265
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the government “search[ed]” Mr. Jones’s vehicle when it physically installed
the GPS tracker.266 The government invoked Katz and argued that
Mr. Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the underside of the Jeep.267 Justice Scalia rejected this argument, stating
that “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the
Katz formulation.”268 Instead of using Katz, Scalia revived the common-law trespass test.269 This test dictated that when “the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area . . . a search has undoubtedly occurred.”270
As in Kyllo, Scalia was concerned about preserving the degree of

259. Id. at 405.
260. Id. at 402.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 402–03.
263. Id. at 403. The government conceded that the warrant had not been complied with.
Id. at 403 n.1.
264. Id. at 403.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 404.
267. Id. at 406.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 405–07. Note, though, that despite relying on the common-law notion of “trespass,” under this test the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all common-law trespasses. See id. at 411 n.8. In Jones, Justice Scalia replied to the government’s concern that
intrusion onto an open field in Oliver v. United States had been a “trespass” and yet the
Court had held it was not a “search.” Id. at 410–11 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 176–77, 183 (1984)). Justice Scalia noted that the Court’s theory was “not that the
Fourth Amendment is concerned with ‘any technical trespass that led to the gathering of
evidence.’” Id. at 411 n.8 (quoting concurring opinion). Rather, he stated that the Fourth
Amendment only protects against trespasses of those areas enumerated in the Fourth
Amendment. Id. An open field is not a person, house, paper, or effect, and thus a trespass
onto an open field is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 411.
270. Id. at 406 n.3.
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privacy citizens enjoyed at the time the Fourth Amendment was
enacted.271
He did not, however, go as far as to eliminate Katz.272 He stated
that it still had some utility as a secondary test.273 He added that
the Katz test had been “added to, not substituted for, the commonlaw trespassory test.”274 This may be because he was writing the
majority opinion.275 Professor Timothy MacDonnell has called this
analysis the “trespass plus” test: first, determine whether the government has trespassed on some constitutionally protected space;
if not, second, determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated.276
In Jones, Justice Scalia also rejected the so-called “mosaic theory” used by the lower court and seemingly endorsed by the concurrences.277 The mosaic theory, as defined by Professor Orin Kerr,
is the idea that instead of analyzing the sequential steps of government activity, courts should look at the aggregate government action to determine whether a “search” has occurred.278

271. Id. at 406 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
272. He was writing the majority opinion, so his disdain for Katz was not as prevalent
as in his concurrence in Carter. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
273. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“For unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the
exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive test.”).
274. Id. at 409.
275. Scholars have questioned whether Scalia’s ultimate goal was to eliminate the Katz
test, leaving only the trespass analysis. See, e.g., Stras et al., supra note 5, at 746. Professor
Kerr noted that if the Katz test is retained, then Scalia’s revival of the trespass test does
not make an obvious impact. See id. It alters the analytical steps but may not change how
cases come out. See id.
276. See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 246; Timothy C. MacDonnell, Florida v. Jardines:
The Wolf at the Castle Door, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 79 (2013).
277. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 412 (describing the “vexing problems” posed by the approach
of the concurrences); id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that whether a search
has occurred depends in part on “whether people reasonably expect that their movements
will be recorded and aggregated”); id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that longterm GPS monitoring is a search, even if short-term is not); United States v. Maynard, 615
F.3d 544, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that prolonged surveillance may constitute a
search because “th[e] whole reveals far more than the individual movements it comprises”),
aff’d sub nom. Jones, 565 U.S. 400; see also Kerr, supra note 234, at 313 (citing Orin Kerr,
D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a
Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volok
h.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-mo
nitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search [https://perma.cc/D2BQ-6AAM] (coining the term
“mosaic theory”)).
278. Kerr, supra note 234, at 313.
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Because Justice Scalia decided Jones using the trespass test, he
did not engage with the mosaic theory.279 The trespass test is
rooted in what Professor Kerr called the traditional “sequential approach,” wherein courts analyze government action step-by-step to
determine when a “search” occurs.280 In Jones, a search occurred
the moment the officer physically installed the GPS tracker on Antoine Jones’s vehicle.281 Justice Scalia declined to look at the totality of the government’s action and instead focused on a single snapshot.282 Thus, the trespass test allowed Scalia to draw a bright-line
rule instead of balancing the totality of the government’s action.283
He was critical of the mosaic test because there was no bright-line
showing when a search became unconstitutional.
Justice Scalia employed the revived trespass test again the next
term in Florida v. Jardines.284 There, two detectives approached
the home of Joelis Jardines, who was suspected of growing marijuana.285 One of the detectives brought his drug-sniffing dog.286 When
the detectives and the dog walked onto the porch, the dog signaled
to the presence of drugs inside the house.287 At trial, Mr. Jardines
argued that the dog sniff was an unreasonable search.288
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that because the
government had physically intruded onto the curtilage of Mr.
Jardines’s home, a search had clearly occurred.289 Thus, when the
279. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411–12.
280. Kerr, supra note 234, at 315–16. Professor Kerr cited Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Arizona v. Hicks as an example of the sequential approach; there, the Court looked at distinct steps: the officer saw the expensive stereo equipment, he moved it, then he recorded
the serial number. Id. at 316.
281. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
282. See id. at 412.
283. Not only is there a line-drawing problem regarding how prolonged surveillance
would need to be to constitute a search, but Professor Kerr has detailed the numerous other
uncertainties of the mosaic theory: the test that should be used to determine when a mosaic
has been created, what surveillance methods are applicable, how to determine whether a
mosaic search is reasonable, and what remedies apply to mosaic searches. Kerr, supra note
234, at 329.
284. 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013). Note, though, that in Jardines, Justice Scalia did not explicitly use the term “trespass” anywhere in the opinion. See generally id.
285. Id. at 3.
286. Id. at 3–4.
287. Id. at 4–5.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 5–6 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)). As he did in
Kyllo, Scalia expounded on the importance of the home. Id. at 6. He noted that the right to
be free from the government in one’s home was at the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment
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government “physically intrud[es]” on an area protected by the
Fourth Amendment, Scalia said there was no need to even consider
Katz.290 He noted that one feature of the property analysis was that
it “keeps easy cases easy.”291 Either the government has physically
intruded or it has not.292 This analysis eliminates the need to engage in the wishy-washy analysis from Katz.293
Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for the trespass test and disdain for
the fluffy Katz standard has had a lasting impact on the Court
since his departure. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Carpenter v.
United States evinces many of the same concerns, and contemplates how Scalia’s reasoning could be applied in the digital age.294
In Carpenter, the Court examined whether the warrantless
search and seizure of location information from one’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment.295 The majority used the rationale
from Katz to determine that the Fourth Amendment had been violated.296 It held that even though individuals share their records
with a third party—the cell phone company—they do not forfeit
their reasonable expectations of privacy in the records.297 The majority thus refused to apply the “third-party doctrine”—a doctrine
based on the Katz rationale where individuals lose their reasonable
expectations of privacy in information when they share it with a
third party.298
and called the home “first among equals.” Id. Because the curtilage is both spatially and
psychologically linked to the home, he deemed it part of the home itself. Id. at 6–7.
290. Id. at 11.
291. Id. However, Jardines is one of the few cases where Justice Scalia acknowledged
the need to look at an officer’s subjective intent. See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 216. Subjective intent was relevant to the issue of whether the officers had committed a trespass. Id.
at 216–17. He noted that visitors are generally implicitly licensed to approach a home on
the front walkway, knock, and wait for someone to come to the door—as commonly done by
girl scouts or trick-or-treaters. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8. But here, Scalia noted, the officer’s
conduct indicated that their subjective intent was not to enter the curtilage for some customary reason, but rather, to conduct a search. Id. at 10.
292. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5.
293. See id.
294. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261–62 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Scalia himself, though,
did not argue that the trespass test had an application to digital searches. In Jones, Scalia
wrote that searches “involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 411.
295. 138 S. Ct. at 2211 (majority opinion).
296. Id. at 2217.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2216–17. The third-party doctrine is derived from United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216
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Justice Gorsuch dissented. Not only did he argue that Katz was
misguided, but he expressed concern that the majority’s reasoning
required courts to perform not one, but two “amorphous balancing
tests.”299 He argued that the majority required courts to first conduct the Katz analysis, then further balance the privacy interests
to determine whether to apply the third-party doctrine.300 He argued that the majority opinion did not offer a workable test and
was susceptible to the same fuzziness as Katz: “At what point does
access to electronic data amount to ‘arbitrary’ authority? When
does police surveillance become ‘too permeating’? And what sort of
‘obstacles’ should judges ‘place’ in law enforcement’s path when it
does?”301 In addition, Justice Gorsuch’s rationale was reminiscent
of Justice Scalia’s abhorrence for judicial activism. He noted that
judges should decide based on “democratically legitimate sources
of law” and not “their own biases or personal policy preferences.”302
Instead, Justice Gorsuch advocated for using the trespass test.303
He noted that in the digital age, the third-party doctrine—a legacy
of Katz—is no longer tenable because we now store so much of our
private information digitally on servers held by third parties.304 He
argued that digital data is an “effect[]” under the Fourth Amendment, and its owner has a legal interest in it.305 That legal interest,
he argued, “might even rise to the level of a property right.”306 Because the issue had not been briefed or argued before the lower

(describing the third-party doctrine).
299. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 2266.
302. Id. at 2268 (quoting Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26
J.L. & POL. 123, 127 (2011)).
303. Id. at 2267–68 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013)).
304. Id. at 2262, 2266.
305. Id. at 2269.
306. Id. at 2272. Justice Gorsuch noted that one issue that would need to be developed
is what body of property law federal courts should apply. Id. at 2268. He posited that the
answer might be current positive law, the common law at 1791, or some combination of the
two. Id. Justices Thomas and Alito have also raised this concern. In Byrd v. United States,
Justice Thomas concurred, and asked “what body of law determines whether that property
interest is present—modern state law, the common law of 1791, or something else?” 138 S.
Ct. 1518, 1531 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Alito raised this concern in his Jones
concurrence, positing that under the property rationale, Fourth Amendment protections
could differ from state to state. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 425–26 (2012) (Alito,
J., concurring). In Jones, the Jeep belonged to Mr. Jones’s wife, and therefore his property
interest in it might depend on whether the state where the search took place recognized
community property between spouses. Id.
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courts, Justice Gorsuch did not decide whether the government
committed a trespass when it seized Mr. Carpenter’s cell site location information, but he noted that it would have been Mr. Carpenter’s most promising argument that his Fourth Amendment rights
had been violated.307
Scholars differ on the applicability of the trespass analysis to
digital searches.308 Justice Scalia himself never advocated for its
use for searches of digital data where there was no physical trespass; he said the Katz test was still applicable in those instances.309
Indeed, some scholars argue that under a narrow reading of the
trespass test from Jones, it would not apply to searches of data
without physical trespass.310 Others, though, argue that the property analysis is worthy of serious consideration and could offer
broader and more secure protections than Katz in the digital age.311
As we look to the future, we should note that the majority of the
current Supreme Court Justices have indicated a willingness to

307. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
308. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.1(e) (5th ed. 2019) (discussing trespass test in digital age and citing sources).
309. In Jones, Scalia wrote that searches “involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 411.
310. E.g., Andrew G. Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
547, 580–81 (2017). Professor Kerr has argued that the proper way to deal with digital
searches is to use the standard from the Carpenter majority: courts should look at the type
of data implicated and whether the disclosure was voluntary. Orin S. Kerr, Implementing
Carpenter: The Digital Fourth Amendment 20 (USC Legal Studies Paper No. 18-29, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3.papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257 [https://perma.cc/DD5U-GW
XU]. In his concurrence in Jones, Justice Alito noted that in recent years courts had analyzed cases about unwanted electronic contact under a tort theory of trespass, holding that
the transmission of electrons is a sufficient physical touching. 565 U.S. at 426 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (citing cases). Yet Justice Alito questioned whether that same analysis could
also apply to Fourth Amendment cases. Id. at 426–27.
311. E.g., Melody J. Brannon, Carpenter v. United States: Building a Property-Based
Fourth Amendment Approach for Digital Data, CRIM. JUST. MAG. (Winter 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-magazi
ne/2019/winter/carpenter-v-united-states [https://perma.cc/DRR7-CVX5]; Megan Blass,
Note, The New Data Marketplace: Protecting Personal Data, Electronic Communications,
and Individual Privacy in the Age of Mass Surveillance Through a Return to a PropertyBased Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577, 588 (2015) (“Vesting property rights in personal data and electronic communications will provide the Court
with a tangible foundation for applying its trespass theory.”); see also LAFAVE, supra note
308, § 2.1(e) n.145 (citing sources).
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use the trespass test.312 Only Justices Alito and Breyer have been
unwilling to use it.313
II. STANDARDS: “SLOSHING THROUGH THE FACTBOUND MORASS
OF ‘REASONABLENESS’”314
Despite his avowed support of bright-line rules and disdain for
totality-of-the-circumstances tests involving balancing,315 Justice
Scalia acknowledged that “for my sins, I will probably write some
opinions that use them.”316 He wrote a number of opinions which
departed from his general preference for rules, and instead applied
standards.317 But even though he acknowledged this inconsistency,
he specifically declined to address what he called the “hardest
question”: when is a standard avoidable and when is it not?318

312. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (praising the trespass
test); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 13 (2013) (Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion); Jones, 565 U.S. at 400 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion). Further,
Justice—then Judge—Kavanaugh was on the D.C. Circuit when it heard Jones. Judge Kavanaugh dissented from a denial of a rehearing en banc, arguing that the court should have
analyzed the case using the trespass rationale. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–
771 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), denying reh’g en banc to United States v.
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Jones, 565 U.S. 400. He did not say
definitively whether he thought the trespass rationale would have applied in that case, but
asserted that it should have been briefed and argued. Id. at 771. We do not know what
Justice Barrett’s position is as she did not have any cases involving this issue when she was
a judge on the Seventh Circuit. However, as a former clerk for Justice Scalia, one can predict
she would be a proponent of the trespass doctrine.
313. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 16 (Alito, J., dissenting).
314. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
315. Professor Rachel Barkow, a former Scalia clerk, joked that if you wanted to make
Scalia gasp, mention a totality-of-the-circumstances test. Stras et al., supra note 5, at 770.
In one of his administrative law dissents, Justice Scalia jeeringly referred to such tests as
“th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.” See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1187.
317. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 495 (examining cases in which Scalia deviated from his stated preference for rules and referring to him as something of a “fainthearted rule-ist”). In various cases, Justice Scalia balanced the rights of individuals versus
the needs of the government based on what would make good policy, despite, on other occasions, disavowing the “good-policy-is-constitutional-law school of jurisprudence.” Minnesota
v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 494–95 (examining cases where Scalia used standards rather than rules).
318. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1187.
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This Part will attempt to tackle that question. In substantive
Fourth Amendment decisions and in cases involving criminal defendants, Scalia usually applied rules.319 But in special needs cases
that were largely civil in nature, as well as in cases regarding the
correct remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, Scalia strayed
and applied a standard.320
Section A of this Part outlines Justice Scalia’s special needs
cases, many of which use balancing tests.321 Section B examines
cases involving remedies for Fourth Amendment violations,322 and
Section C discusses the implications of choosing to apply a rule rather than a standard.323
A. Special Needs
One exception to the warrant requirement is the “special needs”
search. The special needs doctrine grew out of the “administrative
search[]” framework, which originated in the 1960s.324 The term
“special needs” was first used by Justice Blackmun in 1985 in New
Jersey v. T.L.O. to refer to cases which required a lower standard
of justification than probable cause.325 Because a warrant and
probable cause are not required in these cases, reasonableness is
determined by balancing governmental and private interests.326
The special needs doctrine is applicable in “exceptional circumstances” where there is a special need distinct from ordinary law
enforcement.327 The term “special needs” is now a catch-all for
many types of searches that require less than probable cause, such
319. See supra Part I (substantive Fourth Amendment); infra notes 353–71 and accompanying text (criminal defendants).
320. See infra sections II.A, II.B.
321. See infra section II.A.
322. See infra section II.B.
323. See infra section II.C.
324. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967); see See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541, 543–44 (1967). For a description of the evolution of the special needs exception, see Eve
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 245, 260, 276
(2011).
325. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001) (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
326. Id.
327. Id. This distinction is not always clear or easy to apply. See Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 281, 295 (2016) (describing inconsistencies in special needs cases regarding
“ordinary crime control”).
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as administrative searches, border searches, and searches of
closely regulated industries.328
Justice Scalia wrote six special needs decisions while on the
Court; in four of them he found for the government and in two he
found for the individual.329 Unlike in other Fourth Amendment
cases, where Scalia avoided balancing tests at all costs, in special
needs cases he occasionally embraced them.330 Scholars have noted
that the dispositive issues for Justice Scalia in special needs cases
appeared to be (1) whether there was a real, documented special
need behind the policy, and (2) whether the search was in a civil
context or predominately geared towards ordinary criminal wrongdoing.331 In special needs cases that dealt largely with civil issues,
Justice Scalia appeared to be more amenable to using balancing
tests. But where the issue was whether a search sought criminal
wrongdoing, Justice Scalia was less open to balancing policy interests, and instead utilized his rule-based approach.
Two cases involving urinalysis drug tests—National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab and Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton—illustrate the first of those issues: whether there is a documented special need behind the policy.332 In Von Raab, Justice
Scalia explicitly engaged in a balancing analysis.333 There, the majority held that it was reasonable for the U.S. Customs Service to
randomly drug test its employees without a warrant and without
probable cause.334 The majority weighed the government’s inter-

328. Friedman & Stein, supra note 327, at 294–95.
329. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding for
the individual); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 91–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding for the government); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (finding for the government);
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(finding for the individual); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (finding for the
government); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding
for the government).
330. See Manning, supra note 3, at 767–68 (noting that in special needs cases, Scalia
“acted on a perceived invitation to exercise the kind of common law discretion he presumed
judges generally should not have”).
331. See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 221–26 (noting one distinguishing factor in
Scalia’s special needs cases was whether the search was for ordinary law enforcement purposes); Kannar, supra note 116, at 1338–42 (distinguishing cases based on whether there
was a documented special need).
332. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662–63; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
333. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 677 (majority opinion).
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ests against the individuals’ interests and found that the government’s interest in public safety outweighed the individuals’ privacy
interests.335
Justice Scalia dissented.336 But his issue was not with the balancing analysis. In fact, he endorsed it: he wrote that while there
were “some absolutes” in Fourth Amendment law, “as soon as those
have been left behind . . . the question comes down to whether a
particular search has been ‘reasonable,’ [and] the answer depends
largely on the social necessity that prompts the search.”337
Scalia dissented instead because he found that the case lacked
“real evidence of a real problem” of drug use among customs officials.338 He noted that the government had failed to show even one
example in which a customs employee used drugs and that use
caused him to accept bribes, reveal classified information, or commit any other misconduct.339 Thus, Scalia found that the alleged
policy interest behind the search did not exist, and therefore the
search was not reasonable.340
Vernonia also dealt with urinalysis drug tests, but Justice Scalia
came out in favor of the testing.341 There, a district-wide policy allowed random drug tests of student athletes in a school district in
Oregon.342 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first noted that
there was no clear practice either approving or disapproving of
urine tests for public school students in 1791.343 He then proceeded
to balance the individual interests against the government’s.344 He
noted that the case involved a supervisory relationship between
children and their schoolteachers, similar to in loco parentis.345 He

335. Id.
336. Id. at 680–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
337. Id. He cited. T.L.O. as an example, and noted that there, the search was appropriate
because drug use in schools had become a serious social problem. Id. (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
338. Id. at 681.
339. Id. at 683.
340. Id. at 683–84.
341. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658, 662–63 (1995).
342. Id. at 650.
343. Id. at 652–53.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 654–55. Justice Scalia noted that the supervisory relationship here was akin
to the one between a man on probation and his probation officer in Griffin v. Wisconsin. Id.
(citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)).
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wrote that to determine whether a search is “reasonable,” one must
take that relationship into account.346 He described the manner in
which urine samples were collected—male students used a urinal
and were observed from behind; female students produced a sample in a stall with a female monitor standing outside—and found
the privacy interests “negligible.”347 On the other side, he found
that the interest in deterring drug use among school children was
great, and that student athletes were at a particularly high risk of
harm if they used drugs.348 He cited the district court’s finding that
not only was drug use a serious problem in Vernonia schools, but
that student athletes were among the strongest users.349 Not only
did he do a balancing analysis, but he referenced the test from Katz
v. United States, writing that student athletes have even lesser expectations of privacy because they are accustomed to using public
locker rooms and because they have voluntarily chosen to join a
sports team and subject themselves to greater regulation.350
Though both Vernonia and Von Raab dealt with urinalysis drug
tests, Justice Scalia explained the divergence in his opinions: in
Von Raab there was no evidence that customs officials were using
drugs, but in Vernonia there was an “immediate crisis” of students
indulging in drug use.351 As Professor George Kannar noted, these
cases exhibit one of the dispositive issues in special needs cases for
Scalia: whether there was, in fact, a documented special need.352
That need must be more than a mere policy interest, but rather
must include a “demonstrated basis for a policy.”353

346. Id. at 656 (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial
and tutelary responsibility for children.”).
347. Id. at 658.
348. Id. at 662.
349. Id. at 648–49.
350. Id. at 657–58; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (expectations of privacy). Professor MacDonnell noted that in Vernonia,
Scalia clearly deviated from his originalist approach, electing instead to use the Katz test.
See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 222.
351. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
681 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting). The district court found that “a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion,
that disciplinary actions had reached epidemic proportions, and that the rebellion was being
fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student’s misperceptions about the drug
culture.” Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662–63 (quoting district court opinion) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
352. Kannar, supra note 116, at 1338–42.
353. Id. at 1342.
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Justice Scalia’s dissents in two other special needs cases—Ferguson v. City of Charleston and Maryland v. King—address the
second issue: whether the primary purpose of the search was ordinary criminal wrongdoing.354 In Ferguson, the majority held that
warrantless urinalysis tests of pregnant women by a state hospital
without their consent violated the Fourth Amendment.355 The majority found that the primary purpose of the policy was to detect
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and thus the special needs exception did not apply.356
Justice Scalia dissented. He endorsed the lower court’s finding
that the primary purpose of the urine tests was to protect both
mothers and their unborn children, and noted that the finding was
binding upon the Court unless it was clearly erroneous.357 He compared the doctors in that case to the probation officers in Griffin v.
Wisconsin, and argued that they were concerned with public welfare, not law enforcement.358 Thus, he argued that the special
needs doctrine applied.359
In contrast, in King, Justice Scalia argued that the search did
not seek anything beyond ordinary criminal wrongdoing and therefore the special needs exception did not apply.360 King dealt with
whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited collecting DNA swabs
from people arrested on felony charges.361 The majority engaged in
a balancing test and found that the government interest (the need
for law enforcement to safely and accurately identify people in custody)362 outweighed the “minimal” privacy intrusion of having one’s
cheek swabbed for DNA.363

354. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 470 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 98 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
355. 532 U.S. at 86 (majority opinion).
356. Id. at 81–84.
357. Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 101.
359. Id. at 98.
360. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 470 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 440–41 (majority opinion).
362. In addition, the majority cited the need to ascertain an arrestee’s identity and criminal history—in order to assess their level of dangerousness—as another government interest. Id. at 459–50.
363. Id. at 449, 461, 465–66.
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Justice Scalia dissented, refusing to engage in a balancing analysis.364 He stated that balancing analyses were only appropriate in
special needs cases where the primary purpose was not detecting
criminal wrongdoing.365 Here, he argued that the primary purpose
was to seek ordinary criminal wrongdoing: police were using the
DNA data to tie arrestees to other, unsolved crimes.366 The lag in
time between the arrest and the DNA results showed that the purpose could not possibly be merely to identify who was in custody.367
That purpose could be accomplished through standard fingerprinting.368 He ended his dissent on a forceful note: “I doubt that the
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been
so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”369
The divergence between Ferguson and King can be drawn on
whether the primary purpose of the search was to uncover ordinary
criminal wrongdoing.370 In instances where the purpose of the
search was a civil issue, Scalia had no objection to warrantless
searches without probable cause. But where the search sought to
uncover criminal wrongdoing, Scalia objected. In King, he noted
that no matter the result of a balancing analysis, a suspicionless
search would never be appropriate if its subject was ordinary criminal wrongdoing.371 And in Ferguson, he noted that the “social judgment” was irrelevant—policy issues should be dealt with by the
legislature.372

364. Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“No matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless searches are never allowed . . . [for] ordinary crime-solving.”).
365. Id. at 468.
366. Id. at 470.
367. Id. at 471–76.
368. Id. at 480.
369. Id. at 482.
370. See id. at 469; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 98 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
371. 569 U.S. at 469.
372. 532 U.S. at 92.

BLOOM 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

756

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

4/22/2021 9:09 AM

[Vol. 55:713

B. Remedies for Fourth Amendment Violations
In cases involving remedies for Fourth Amendment violations,
Justice Scalia seemed to abandon his verve for limited judicial discretion. In this area he unapologetically used balancing tests and
decided cases based on the “substantial social costs.”373
Murray v. United States is an early indication of Justice Scalia’s
concern with the exclusionary rule.374 There, police broke into a
warehouse, saw bales of marijuana, then left and got a warrant
without using the fact that they had already entered the warehouse and seen the marijuana.375 Writing for the majority, Scalia
held that the marijuana should not be suppressed because although the original search was unlawful, the search pursuant to the
valid warrant was an independent source.376 Justice Marshall dissented, pointing out that this would provide an incentive for officers to conduct illegal searches and then get warrants afterwards.377
He wrote that the majority’s holding “severely undermine[d] the
deterrence function of the exclusionary rule.”378
Justice Scalia’s disdain for the exclusionary rule crystalized in
Hudson v. Michigan.379 Writing for the majority, he cited policy issues to justify not applying the exclusionary rule.380 In Hudson,
police executed a search warrant at the house of Booker Hudson,
searching for drugs and firearms.381 When officers arrived at Mr.
Hudson’s home, they announced their presence, but waited only
“three to five seconds” before opening his unlocked door.382 Mr.
Hudson argued that the evidence obtained should be suppressed
because the officers violated the knock-and-announce rule.383
373. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
638 (1987); see Friedman & Stein, supra note 327, at 296 (noting the real curiosity of Scalia’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that he did not provide for a remedy); Stras et al.,
supra note 5, at 763 (“When you look to the remedy, he seemed to not necessarily be the
friend of criminal defendants . . . .”).
374. 487 U.S. 533, 536–37 (1988).
375. Id. at 535–36.
376. Id. at 538.
377. Id. at 546 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
378. Id.
379. 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 588.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 588–89.
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Michigan conceded that the knock-and-announce rule had been violated, but argued that exclusion of the evidence was too great a
remedy.384
Justice Scalia agreed. He noted that the exclusionary rule generated “‘substantial social costs’ . . . which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.”385 He also worried
that excluding evidence distorted the truth-finding process because it suppressed reliable evidence.386 He proceeded to balance
the deterrence benefits the exclusionary rule provided against the
social costs in the case.387 The deterrence benefits, he found, were
miniscule: law enforcement officials had little incentive to violate
the knock-and-announce rule as they already had a search warrant.388 Thus, deterrence was not paramount.389 In contrast, the
social costs were high: they would include not only releasing dangerous criminals, but also inviting a flood of litigation regarding
the knock-and-announce rule.390
Further, Scalia noted that while perhaps in 1961 the exclusionary rule was a necessary deterrent because Dollree Mapp391 could
not file a § 1983 claim, now there were other remedies besides the
exclusionary rule.392 Victims of Fourth Amendment violations
could now file claims under § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,393 and moreover,
they could find attorneys to represent them in such cases because
Congress had authorized attorney’s fees for civil rights plaintiffs.394
Further, Scalia had confidence in law enforcement and did not
think deterrence was necessary. He wrote that there is now “increasing evidence that police forces across the United States take
the constitutional rights of citizens seriously” and stated that
“modern police forces are staffed with professionals.”395 He thought
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at 590.
Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
Id.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 596–97.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 595.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–98.
Id. at 599.
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that the threat of internal discipline for police officers would be a
significant enough deterrent.396 After explicitly balancing these
factors, Justice Scalia found in favor of the government.397 He considered the “massive remedy” of the exclusionary rule unjustified
and thought other remedies, such as civil suits, were more appropriate.398
But when faced with these civil suits, Justice Scalia denied recovery again and again. He wrote a total of eight Bivens and § 1983
Fourth Amendment decisions and found for the government in all
but one of them.399 And in these decisions, he frequently used balancing tests.
For example, in Anderson v. Creighton, Justice Scalia held that
FBI agents were entitled to qualified immunity after they violated
an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.400 There, agents
searched the Creighton family’s home without a warrant.401 The
Creighton family was not the target of the search; rather, the agent
believed that a man suspected of bank robbery might be there, but
he was not.402
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the agents
were entitled to qualified immunity; they could not be held personally liable for the violation.403 He balanced the interests on both
sides, noting that civil damages were often the only realistic remedy for constitutional violations.404 On the other hand, though, he
wrote that allowing suits against government officials would lead

396. Id. at 598–99.
397. Id. at 599.
398. Id. at 598–99.
399. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 767 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (finding for the government); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
397 (2007) (finding for the government); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (finding
for the government); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia J., concurring)
(finding for the government); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 490 (1994) (finding for the
government); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding for the individual); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599–600 (1989)
(finding for the government); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding for the government); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (finding for the government).
400. 483 U.S. at 637–41.
401. Id. at 637.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 641.
404. Id. at 638.
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to “substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal
monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.”405 He noted that qualified
immunity addressed this concern and that it should be applied as
long as the official’s actions were objectively “reasonable.”406 He relied not on textualism or originalism, but on precedent, and unapologetically stated that the doctrine of qualified immunity “reflects a balance that has been struck ‘across the board.’”407
The plaintiffs put forward an originalist argument, pointing out
that at common law officers were strictly liable if they searched an
innocent third party’s home for a fugitive who was not present.408
Justice Scalia rejected this argument, calling it “procrustean.”409
He stated that “we have never suggested that the precise contours
of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the
often arcane rules of the common law.”410
Scholars have pointed out how much this opinion contradicts
Scalia’s commitment to originalism. Professor MacDonnell noted
that Anderson is not only inconsistent with Scalia’s originalist approach, but seems to “dismiss core tenants of originalism.”411 Professor Kerr also stated that he had struggled to reconcile Anderson
with Scalia’s originalist views, and wondered if it came out that
way because it was only Scalia’s first term.412
Anderson not only betrayed Justice Scalia’s originalism, but it
also failed to limit judicial discretion. Because he did not root the
decision in originalism or textualism, Scalia decided the case by
balancing interests.413 It is unclear how Justice Scalia would or
could have distinguished this decision from the legislating from the
bench that he claimed to abhor.

405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 642.
408. Id. at 644.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 645.
411. MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 230.
412. Stras et al., supra note 5, at 764. In 2011, though, Justice Scalia reaffirmed the
holding from Anderson in his decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
413. 483 U.S. at 642.
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Another civil suit where Scalia explicitly balanced individual
and state interests was Scott v. Harris.414 There, officers and Victor
Harris were involved in a high-speed car chase.415 When Mr. Harris did not follow officers’ directives to pull over, Officer Scott
bumped his vehicle into Mr. Harris’s, causing him to spin off the
road, flip over, and crash.416 As a result, Mr. Harris was rendered
a quadriplegic.417
Mr. Harris filed a § 1983 action, asserting that Officer Scott used
excessive force which resulted in an unreasonable seizure and thus
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.418 Mr. Harris argued that
the Court should apply the bright-line rule from Tennessee v. Garner: use of deadly force is only reasonable when officers have probable cause to believe (1) the suspect “poses[] an immediate threat
of serious physical harm,” and (2) “deadly force must have been
necessary to prevent escape.”419 Justice Scalia commended Mr.
Harris’s attempt to craft a clear test, but stated that instead of applying it, the Court “must still slosh [its] way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”420 Here, he was not enthusiastic
about a bright-line rule based on probable cause because it was in
the context of a civil remedy, not a criminal case.421
Instead, he turned to a balancing test. On Mr. Harris’s side,
Scalia noted the high likelihood of serious injury or death that Officer Scott caused by bumping into Mr. Harris’s car.422 On the government’s side, he pointed out the actual and imminent threat that
Mr. Harris’s driving posed to pedestrians, civil motorists, and the
officers involved in the chase.423 Justice Scalia posed the question
of how the Court should weigh “the perhaps lesser probability of
injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger

414. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Orin Kerr stated that Scott v. Harris was an
example of where Scalia could find no alternative to considering the totality of the circumstances. Stras et al., supra note 5, at 769.
415. 550 U.S. at 374–75.
416. Id. at 375.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 375–76.
419. Id. at 381–82 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).
420. Id. at 383.
421. See supra section I.B.
422. Harris, 550 U.S. at 384.
423. Id. at 383–84.
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probability of injuring or killing a single person.”424 Scalia decided
that the Court should take into account the “relative culpability”
of the lives at risk.425 Mr. Harris, he argued, had caused the risk
by engaging in the high-speed chase in the first place—and that
was dispositive on the issue.426 Thus, Scalia found that Officer
Scott’s actions were reasonable. He laid down a rule: “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at
risk of serious injury or death.”427
Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the determination of
whether the seizure was “reasonable” should have been left to the
jury.428 Justice Stevens noted that in the video of the incident, it
was not clear whether there were even any pedestrians on the road
who would have been at risk of injury.429 Further, he noted that
the chase was “hardly the stuff of Hollywood” and there were not
any “close calls” in which innocent bystanders could have been injured.430 Justice Stevens criticized the general rule that Scalia had
put forth, arguing that it was not clear that Mr. Harris’s conduct
had threatened the lives of any innocent bystanders.431
CONCLUSION
Throughout his career, Justice Scalia was adamant about using
bright-line rules instead of fuzzy standards. He was especially intentional about using rules when dealing with criminal matters,

424. Id. at 384.
425. Id.
426. Id. Earlier in the opinion, Scalia described the incident as a “Hollywood-style car
chase of the most frightening sort.” Id. at 380.
427. Id. at 386. The concurring Justices disagreed, though, about whether the holding
constituted a per se rule. Justice Breyer stated that he disagreed with the majority insofar
as it articulated a per se rule, arguing that statement of the holding was too absolute. Id. at
389 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, though, noted that she did not consider the
majority’s holding a “mechanical, per se rule.” Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She cited
the Court’s balancing analysis, and argued that the inquiry was fact specific and did not lay
down a clear test. Id.
428. Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
429. Id. at 392–93.
430. Id. at 392.
431. Id. at 396.
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believing that rules could help protect the rights of unpopular criminal defendants.
And yet, in cases involving civil special needs as well as remedies
for Fourth Amendment violations, Justice Scalia seemed to abandon his enthusiasm for rules. In these cases, he used standards
that allowed for unbridled judicial discretion in balancing individual and government interests. He used balancing tests that let
judges impute their own subjective preferences onto the law under
the veneer of objectivity.432
Further, in these cases, Justice Scalia almost always sided with
the government. Indeed, scholars have pointed out that when
courts use balancing tests, the government usually wins.433 In civil
special needs cases, Justice Scalia sided with the government as
long as the search was not directed at criminal evidence. When
dealing with remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, he
chipped away at the exclusionary rule, arguing that police officers
were “professionals” who did not need the deterrent effect of suppression.434 He argued there were better remedies, like civil suits,
and yet when faced with those civil suits he repeatedly granted officers qualified immunity.435 Finally, though Justice Scalia professed to take seriously the rights of unpopular criminal defendants,436 his decision in Scott v. Harris—albeit a civil case— seemed

432. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 239 (1993) (“The very concept of balancing suggests that the
Court must develop some objective measure for this task. It has never done so, leaving these
opinions open to the criticism that the Justices are imposing their subjective preferences,
while pretending that these judgments are the product of some neutral, objective, almost
scientific process.”).
433. E.g., Friedman & Stein, supra note 327, at 297 (“In reality, the Court’s idea of ‘balancing’ is illusory—the test is rigged such that the government almost always wins.”);
Cloud, supra note 432, at 280 (noting that in Fourth Amendment balancing cases, collective
government interests tend to outweigh individual privacy interests); Strossen, supra note
15, at 1176 (arguing the Court overvalues government interests in balancing tests); T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965 (1987)
(“Balancing has been a vehicle primarily for weakening earlier categorical doctrines restricting governmental power to search and seize.”). But see Sullivan, supra note 3, at 95–97
(arguing there is no “conservative” or “liberal” bent to the choice of rules versus standards).
434. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006).
435. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (qualified immunity for officer
who conducts warrantless search); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 744 (2011) (qualified
immunity for attorney general after arresting and detaining terrorism suspects using material witness warrants but with improper motive).
436. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1180.
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to depart from that rationale and had no problem taking into account the “relative culpability”437 of the lives at risk.
Justice Scalia’s lasting impact in insisting on a rule over a standard may be his reintroduction of the trespass approach to the
Fourth Amendment. Especially as we move forward into the digital
age, the trespass approach may offer a clearer rule showing when
a search has occurred, alleviating the need to rely only on the openended standard from Katz v. United States. Justice Gorsuch stated
as much in his dissent in Carpenter v. United States: “These ancient principles may help us address modern data cases too.”438 Not
only has Justice Gorsuch argued to build on the reintroduced trespass test, but a substantial majority of the current Court has accepted its revival.

437. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007).
438. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2269 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

